Increased Medicare
Expenditures for Physicians' Services: What Are the Causes?
In light of rising expenditures for physicians' services and the scheduled decreases in the amounts Medicare pays for such services, we identified the sources of change in the volume and intensity of Medicare physicians' services. We found that the per capita volume and intensity of physicians' services used by Medicare beneficiaries increased more than 30% between 1993 and 1998. Our analyses indicated that, at most, half of this increase was due to measurable changes in the demographic composition, places of residence, prevalence of health conditions, and managed care enrollment of beneficiaries. The other half was due to a general increase in the use of care across beneficiary categories.
Technological change in medicine undoubtedly contributes to rising health care costs (Fuchs 1996) . However, this consensus rests more on deduction than on positive findings: researchers have shown that quantifiable supply and demand factors, such as the aging of the population, can explain less than half of the growth in total health care expenditures. Thus, researchers have attributed the substantial remaining ''residual'' growth to technological change (Newhouse 1992) . There is little evidence about the direct effects of technological change on expenditures or about the effects across types of patients or services.
In this study, we examined the determinants of growth in volume and intensity for a class of services: physicians' services provided to Medicare beneficiaries. This expands on previous work on technological change in medicine in three ways. First, we looked at changes for specific subsets of beneficiaries and types of services rather than looking at total costs. This is important because technological change may have differential effects across subpopulations and/or diseases. And while we examined only physicians' services, nearly all health care is driven by the practices of physicians who not only see patients themselves but admit patients to hospitals, order tests and prescribe drugs. Second, we were able to exploit a feature of Medicare's physician reimbursement system to quantify how much of the increase in physicians' services is due to a greater volume and intensity of services being provided, and to examine the proportion of this volume increase that can be directly attributed to new technologies. Third, as described later, our findings have implications for the methods used to pay physicians under Medicare-and for administered pricing systems in general.
Background
Questions about whether increases in spending are warranted and how much should be spent on health care are among the most pressing in health policy. Rising expenditures, especially for government programs like Medicare, should be justified by the improvements in health they bring. Technological change is thought to be a major driver of increasing costs; however, there is no consensus about whether high-technology care is worth its high price. An emerging literature on technological change in treatments for specific conditions has revealed that despite their contribution to rising costs, these technological advances have led to constant or declining prices per episode of care (e.g., Cutler and McClellan 1996; Frank, Berndt and Busch 1999) . However, this literature is currently limited to a small number of conditions for which there have been advances in treatment.
These kinds of questions are particularly germane to debates about Medicare payments for physicians' services because, unlike any other services reimbursed by Medicare, they are effectively constrained by a global budget. The method for determining the size of that budget is also the subject of heated debate. The sustainable growth rate (SGR) method, in use since 1997, seeks to constrain costs by tying increases in physician payments to growth in real per capita gross domestic product (GDP). In implementing the SGR, Congress agreed, in principle, that a system that would allow expenditures for physicians' services to grow as fast as the economy as a whole was affordable and reasonable. Now that this method has resulted in negative update factors for 2002 through 2005-decreasing the price paid per unit of service by more than 15%-critics of the method are pointing out that the SGR system does not account for increases in the actual costs of providing physician services to the Medicare population. Such increases are driven by changes in medical technology, provider productivity, and the health of Medicare beneficiaries-effects that are largely manifested in changes in the volume and intensity of services delivered. This paper has sought to disentangle these causes of increased volume and intensity of physicians' services.
Data
We used data from the 1993 and 1998 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) Cost and Use Files and linked claims data for MCBS respondents. The Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey is an annual rotating panel survey of Medicare beneficiaries. 1 The Cost and Use File contains information about respondents' demographics, health status, insurance coverage, and cost to the Medicare program. Linking the claims data to the MCBS allowed us to look in detail at the exact mix of physicians' services being used over time by fee-for-service beneficiaries. 2 In the case of the physician fee schedule, volume and intensity can be measured using the resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS). The RBRVS was created to provide a standard system of pricing that weights physicians' services according to the resources used in delivering the service. The total weight assigned to a service is a combination of a ''physician work'' component, a practice expense component, and a malpractice expense component. Each of these is measured in relative value units (RVUs). The physician work values represent the time, technical skill, physical effort, mental effort, and judgment required; they also incorporate the stress experienced by the physician due to potential risk to the patient to perform the service (Hsiao et al. 1988) . We thus can quantify volume and intensity using the number of RVUs delivered to beneficiaries over time.
We calculated the number of RVUs used by each beneficiary by analyzing claims data matched to a longitudinal database supplied to us by the American Medical Association. This database contained the RVUs assigned to each Current Procedural Terminology code, by year. 3 Medicare beneficiaries who had end-stage renal disease (ESRD) or were institutionalized at any point during the calendar year in question were excluded, as were beneficiaries in Medicare health maintenance organizations (HMOs) or without Part B coverage for any part of the year. 4
Methods
Our strategy using the MCBS data was to track changes in the volume and intensity of services delivered by looking at changes in the number of RVUs for services consumed by beneficiaries over time. Volume and intensity can increase or decrease due to changes in medical practice, in technology, in the case mix of the population being served, and other changes in the supply of and demand for physicians' services. We calculated changes in the volume and intensity of services delivered due to each of these factors: changes in the composition of the Medicare population; changes in sites of care delivery; and increased enrollment in MedicareþChoice plans. We then explored the reasons for volume and intensity increases not explained by these factors.
The RBRVS was phased in over a five-year period beginning in 1992. Most of the changes due to the new payment system occurred that year; thus, we used 1993 as our base year, since it is the first year for which a baseline level of physicians' services volume in terms of relative value units can be established (PPRC 1994) . We chose 1998 as our reference year because it is the latest year for which MCBS data were available and because it reflects RVU use after the first major five-year review of the RBRVS in 1997.
The system of relative value units changed from year to year over this period in two ways. First, the number of RVUs assigned to service codes could increase or decrease in quantity if the nature of a service changed. Second, service codes and their associated RVUs could be eliminated or new codes could be added to account for outdated or new services. 5 The system is updated through an annual review process. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), now the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), also is required to conduct a comprehensive review of the RBRVS every five years. Two such reviews have occurred since the system was implemented in 1992, the first in 1997 and the second in 2001. 6 Thus, we also use updates to the RBRVS as a measure of changes in volume and intensity due to changing medical practices and technology.
We modeled the volume and intensity of services (in RVUs) consumed as a function of beneficiary characteristics. Demographic characteristics on the MCBS included age, gender, place of residence, education, and date of death. To capture beneficiary health status, we included self-reported problems with activities of daily living (ADLs) and instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs), history of smoking, and history of having certain medical conditions. 7 We also used information about whether beneficiaries have employer-provided supplemental insurance, Medigap insurance, or Medicaid since beneficiaries with reduced cost sharing due to such coverage use more physicians' services (Lillard, Rogowski, and Kington 1999) . 8 We included in our models supplemental insurance status but not income, as the latter is extremely unreliable in the MCBS. 9 Changes in the volume and intensity of services delivered to beneficiaries due to differing practice patterns in the geographic locations where beneficiaries reside were captured using variables for urban versus rural residence and for census region.
We fit an individual-level model of the following type to the 1993 MCBS data for beneficiaries in traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare in order to estimate the baseline effects of demographics and case mix on the volume and intensity of services used by beneficiaries. All of the covariates were entered as indicator variables. Beneficiaries reported a history of more than two medical conditions on average and were coded into each of those conditions (i.e., the condition categories are not mutually exclusive).
After evaluating many alternative models, we fit model 1 as a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression using the MCBS cross-sectional weights and robust standard errors to account for survey design effects. 10 The coefficients from the model of RVU use are presented in the appendix table and are as expected. For example, many beneficiary attributes are associated with a greater use of services-including older age, major medical conditions, and higher educational attainment.
Having fit our model to 1993 data, we then used the estimated coefficients from the 1993 model to generate predicted service volume in terms of RVUs for future years. We compared the total predicted growth to the total volume growth to see how much of the change in volume could be attributed to the demographic and casemix factors in the model.
We compared predicted RVU use to actual use in two ways. Using our AMA database, we assigned each 1998 claim two RVU values. One was based on the RVU schedule in place in 1993; the other was based on the RVU schedule in 1998. By comparing these two values, we quantified the extent to which the change in RVU use was due to new or updated codes versus an increase (or decrease) in the use of existing codes. Before doing this, we adjusted the 1998 codes upwards to account for across-the-board cuts in the fee schedule made by HCFA. In performing this analysis, we depended on the RBRVS update system to accurately reflect the intensity of new codes and changes in intensity within codes over time. The difference between the use based on the 1993 fee schedule and later years' RVU usage should reflect technological changes in the form of new services added to the RVU schedule, plus newly covered and updated services. 11 To better understand the causes of these changes, we then evaluated the groups of patients that had notably higher or lower than predicted growth in their use of physicians' services. Lastly, we estimated the amount of the volume and intensity change that could be due to increasing enrollment in Medicare HMOs.
Results
We first analyzed changes in the number of RVUs billed over time for physicians' services and for the professional services of nonphysician practitioners. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about the volume and intensity of physicians' services used by Medicare beneficiaries in 1993 versus 1998. It presents mean and median total RVUs used, as well as breakdowns of inpatient and outpatient RVUs. It also stratifies use by beneficiaries with and without a self-reported major medical condition. For 1998, it presents both the number of RVUs used according to that year's schedule and the number based on the 1993 RVU schedule. There was more than a 30% increase in the volume and intensity of physicians' services used by Medicare bene- ficiaries between 1993 and 1998 (an increase from 38.1 to 49.9 RVUs.) Examining the volume and intensity changes in more detail, Table 1 shows there was little increase in the number of inpatient RVUs used, but a large increase in the use of physicians' services in outpatient settings. 12 There was also an increase in the use of services by people with and without self-reported medical conditions. In 1993, 88.7% of the sample used some physician services. The rate was 89.9% in 1998 (not shown). In addition, conditional on use, beneficiaries used more services on average in 1998 than 1993. Both the mean and median number of services used per capita increased, indicating that the increase was not due only to higher spending on the most severe cases.
Beneficiaries' Use of Services
We decomposed the increase in RVUs into the components due to changes in the Medicare population and the components that cannot be explained by population composition. Table 2 shows beneficiaries' per capita use of services in 1993 and predicted use in 1998. The figure for predicted 1998 use takes into account the changing demographics and health status of the Medicare population. All else equal, the 1998 population as a whole would have been expected to use slightly fewer services (37 vs. 38.1 RVUs). In other words, despite the aging of the population, Medicare beneficiaries' health status and other characteristics in 1998 were consistent with lower use of physicians' services than the 1993 sample.
The 1.1 RVU difference between the predicted use of 37 RVUs by the 1998 sample and of 38.1 RVUs by the 1993 sample can be decomposed into components attributable to types of observed beneficiary characteristics in the model. As shown in Table 2 , a difference of .2 RVUs could be attributed to both the age/gender composition and the place of residence of the 1993 versus the 1998 samples. Specifically, the 1998 population had a greater proportion of disabled beneficiaries under age 65 and beneficiaries in the oldest age category; both of these groups used fewer RVUs than other age groups, controlling for medical conditions. The 1998 population also had a lower proportion of beneficiaries living in urban areas and more beneficiaries living in the west, which contribute to lower predicted use. Other beneficiary characteristics were responsible for a net difference of .7 RVUs between 1993 use and 1998 predicted use. These included lower rates of reported difficulties with ADLs and IADLs, and fewer beneficiaries with a history of heart attacks. 13 We then proceeded to decompose the increase in RVUs into the component due to increases in the use of existing codes-versus the use of new or updated codes-by comparing the second and third columns of Table 3 . The first column in Table 3 is 1998 predicted use based on the model developed on 1993 data, the second is 1998 use based on the 1993 RVU schedule, and the third is 1998 use in terms of the 1998 RVU schedule. The total change between the first and third columns (49.9 À 37.0 ¼ 12.9) can be decomposed into two components.
Increase in the use of existing codes. The difference between 1998 use based on the 1993 schedule and 1998 predicted use is 7.5 RVUs. This constitutes 58% of the total difference between 1993 and 1998 use (7.5/12.9 ¼ 58%). These 7.5 RVUs represent the increase in the use of 1993 existing codes by beneficiaries in 1998. This increase could have been caused by supply-side practice pattern changes such as improvements in the ability of physicians to provide services. Such improvements could reflect a form of technological change. For example, physicians over this period might have been able to perform certain surgical procedures on older patients as their skill and experience with the procedure grew. It also could reflect demand-side changes due to desires for maturing technologies, wealth effects, or taste changes. In order to shed light on the unexplained component of volume and intensity growth, we examined the condition groups whose use differed substantially from that predicted by our model. The patterns did vary somewhat by group, as shown in Table 4 . Some patients, such as those with osteoporosis and stroke, saw increases in the volume and intensity of physicians' services delivered that were not explained by the changing composition of the population with those diseases. Decedents also experienced an increase in the use of existing services. Other disease groups had lower ''unexplained'' growth. Some of these experienced treatment contraction-that is, a reduced use of the services available in 1993. Lung cancer patients, for example, used fewer established services in 1998 than 1993. This was due to a reduction in the use of physicians' services in the inpatient setting (not shown.) All conditions saw some use of services that were either not available in 1993 or for which the number of RVUs increased between 1993 and 1998.
It is interesting to note, however, that few patient groups had unexplained increases or decreases in RVU use that differed significantly from changes in RVU use by people without the condition. In Table 4 , a plus (þ) sign indicates the patient groups that had significantly higher unpredicted increases; a minus (À) sign indicates the conditions that had significantly lower increases. Of the self-reported medical condition groups, only three (plus decedents) had a signifi-cant unexplained increase in RVU use compared to people without those conditions. Two other patient types had significantly lower gains-hip fracture patients and patients without any reported conditions.
Site of Care Delivery
Consistent with commonly reported national trends, the increase in the use of outpatient services was much greater than the increase in the use of inpatient care. 14 The proportion of RVUs associated with inpatient care declined from 36.7% to 29.9% of total RVU use (not shown). What little increase there was in inpatient settings largely came about because of the use of new or updated codes-this accounted for 86% of the unexplained increase in the inpatient use of RVUs. In addition, half of the conditions examined in Table 4 experienced declines in the use of existing inpatient services. In particular, lung cancer patients saw a large decline in their use of existing inpatient services. Of the patient types examined, only decedents received substantially more existing inpatient physicians' services in 1998 than in 1993. Decedents also received a particularly large number of new services. Stroke and osteoporosis patients, who had high overall increases in RVU use, also had higher unpredicted use of inpatient RVUs. Medicare beneficiaries with a history of having broken a hip actually used fewer inpatient RVUs than predicted.
For outpatient services, the overall trends were quite different. There was a mean increase of more than 10 RVUs in outpatient settings. This increase was dominated by the enhanced use of existing codes, which accounted for 67% of the overall outpatient increase. Osteoporosis patients and stroke patients saw an increase in the use of outpatient RVUs that was higher than the mean. Beneficiaries with heart conditions other than those specifically mentioned on the MCBS Increased Medicare Expenditures survey (hypertension, hardening of the arteries, myocardial infarction, and angina/CHD) had significantly higher use. Lung cancer patients, who experienced declines in the use of inpatient RVUs, had high growth in the use of outpatient RVUs. Also notable was that Parkinson's patients saw a large unexplained increase, while Alzheimer's patients used fewer outpatient RVUs than would have been predicted given 1993 baseline practice patterns. Colon cancer patients also had lower than average growth in the use of outpatient physicians' services.
Effect of Medicare Managed Care Enrollment
During the period 1993-98, there was a large increase in enrollment in Medicare managed care plans. The number of Medicare managed care enrollees grew from almost two million in 1993 to more than six million in 1998 (16% of the Medicare population). Numerous studies have shown that there is favorable selection into Medicare HMOs: that is, that healthier than average beneficiaries choose to join such plans (see, for example, PPRC 1996). If this is so, then part of the increase we see in the use of RVUs by fee-forservice beneficiaries could be due to the healthier segment of the Medicare population enrolling in managed care plans, leaving an increasingly less healthy population in fee-for-service Medicare.
To determine the magnitude of this effect, we estimated the relative use of physicians' services by Medicare managed care versus FFS enrollees. 15 First, we used our regression model to predict RVU use based on the observed characteristics of the managed care enrollees. We applied the model to all beneficiaries enrolled in managed care plans at any point during 1993 or 1998, regardless of whether they had Part B coverage for the entire year. However, we did weight beneficiaries in the sample by the length of time they were enrolled. We included these part-year enrollees because prior research has found that new Medicare HMO enrollees are particularly healthy (MedPAC 2000) .
We found that on the basis of observed characteristics, the managed care and FFS enrollees were predicted to have roughly the same amount of RVU use in both 1993 and 1998. Compared to FFS, the managed care population was younger, had lower rates of problems with ADLs and IADLs, and had a lower prevalence of many (but not all) conditions. However, they were better educated and more urban, characteristics predictive of greater use.
In estimates of this kind, unobserved selection is always an issue. For example, HMO enrollees may have systematically less severe heart disease or have preferences for less intensive care that are not captured in the model. We therefore estimated RVU use for the set of 1998 part-year HMO enrollees for whom we had some information about their actual use of care. They also were estimated to have roughly the same average RVU use as the FFS sample (37 RVUs for the FFS sample and 37.3 for the part-year HMO enrollees). However, the beneficiaries who enrolled in Medicare HMOs during 1998 incurred spending for physicians' services at half the rate of the average FFS beneficiary. New, part-year HMO enrollees thus had unobserved characteristics that led them to spend 50% less on physicians' services than predicted during the period in which they were enrolled in fee-for-service Medicare.
For the Medicare managed care population as a whole, this 50% underprediction is an upper bound on the selection effect. First, it is for new enrollees who are known to have particularly low costs (Mello et al. 2002) . Established enrollees likely have use that regresses towards a higher mean level. Second, no previous estimates of selection have been close to 50% in magnitude. Taking 50% as an upper bound on selection, the effect of increasing Medicare managed care enrollment over this period was at most a 5.6% increase in expenditures. 16 The lower bound on the selection effect from our model estimates was a negligible effect.
Discussion
We found that the per capita volume and intensity of physicians' services delivered to non-ESRD, noninstitutionalized fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries, measured using the RBRVS, increased 30% over the mid-1990s. Our analyses do not indicate that this is due to measurable changes in the demographic composition, the places of residence, the prevalence of health conditions, or other characteristics of the Medicare population. Indeed, our analysis indicates that all else equal, the FFS population in 1998 should have used slightly fewer RVUs than the 1993 population. In addition, while we found that the use of services in outpatient settings increased substantially, this increase could not be directly attributed to shifts in site of care from inpatient to outpatient settings.
In fact, the evidence suggests increased use of physicians' services by every type of Medicare beneficiary that we examined. We had hypothesized that conditions in which there had been rapid technological change would see the greatest increases; however, there was evidence of technological change across all conditions. When we queried clinical experts about the determinants of changes in use for patients with selected medical conditions, they pointed to a number of changes in medical knowledge and technology that could have contributed, indicating that within conditions the impact of new technologies is also diffuse. For example, a new technology for stroke-thrombolytic therapywas developed between 1993 and 1998. However, the proportion of acute stroke patients receiving this therapy is so small that it cannot account for the increase in use during this time period. Rather, the clinical experts we interviewed reported that three factors likely contributed to the growth of RVUs used during this time period: a greater appreciation of the value of aggressively treating risk factors for recurrent stroke; the advent of improvements in the accuracy and convenience of imaging of the carotid arteries (magnetic resonance angiography and improvements in Doppler ultrasound); and a greater realization of the value of post-stroke rehabilitation for improving patient outcomes. Lung cancer patients, unlike stroke patients, had a large decrease in the use of existing services between 1993 and 1998, all of which was due to a decrease in hospital use. Three factors were postulated to be responsible for this: improvements in staging, leading to a reduction in the number of surgical resections (i.e., better imaging showed patients who were inoperable for cure); shifts in the site of chemotherapy from the inpatient to the outpatient settings; and increases in the use of hospice, so that patients were not receiving terminal care in-hospital. In sum, even within each condition multiple factors were thought to be the cause of increases in expenditures.
There are three main limitations of these analyses. First, we fit an OLS model to these data because we needed a model that would be com-pletely unbiased. As a result, our model is less precise than it could be. In addition, it is possible that there were changes in unobserved beneficiary characteristics that caused some of the increase in service use.
Second, we cannot say whether these increases in service use were appropriate or whether they would have been different if another payment system was used. There is certainly a relationship between payment and the volume of services delivered: physicians do respond to the prices paid for services. Thus, we cannot evaluate whether service use would have been higher or lower had another payment update system been in place during the time period we examined. Third, while we were able to decompose the unexplained increase in RVUs into ''new and updated'' versus ''existing'' codes, this division does not isolate the effect of new technology. We believe that the new and updated codes are only a lower bound on the extent of technological change. 17 For example, there might be technological change within existing codes that has not been recognized by the RVU review committee, or that does not increase the work associated with providing a service. There also might be changes in technology that produce increases in the use of physicians' services indirectly. For example, better prescription drugs or improved diagnostic tests could increase the use of physician office visits and other physicians' services. In addition, technological change can lead to changes in the identification of the diseases we examined and even to changes in the health status of the population over time. More importantly, however, this work demonstrates the difficulty of developing a payment system that fully accounts for new technology.
Conclusions
We found that Medicare beneficiaries' use of physicians' services increased 30% over the mid-1990s from approximately 38 to 50 relative value units per beneficiary. The changing composition of the Medicare population does not explain the increase, and rising enrollment in Medicare HMOs, and changes in laws and regulations account for, at most, half of the change. Overall, the main driver of change in the volume and intensity of services was a secular increase in the use of care. Only a few patient groups emerged as having unusual RVU growth. For these groups, clinical experts were able to point to a range of changes in medical knowledge and technology that could have contributed to the increase. Decedents also had large increases in their use of physicians' services. Thus, it would appear that the effects of changing medical technology on the increased use of physicians' services are strong and pervasive.
Our analyses have several implications for the debate about the SGR payment update system. First, technical adjustments could be made to the SGR targets to account for the changing composition of the FFS population, but they would be small adjustments relative to the overall increases in service use. Second, a payment update system that attempted to measure ''appropriate'' increases in use due to changing technol-ogy would not be feasible. Such a system would have to consider changes across an extraordinarily broad set of dimensions and conditions to capture all of the possible ways in which technology influences service provision.
Overall, however, our analyses indicate that there are large increases in the per-capita use of physicians' services that cannot be ascribed to discrete causes such as the aging of the population or selective enrollment in managed care. These increases are surprisingly uniform across medical conditions, suggesting that technological advances for particular illnesses are only a partial explanation for rising costs. Changes in the supply of and/or demand for medical care that span patient groups are important drivers of rising costs. An important and challenging area for future research is establishing the value of these pervasive increases in the use of care. 1 The MCBS is referred to as a rotating panel survey because approximately one-quarter of the sample rotates out of the survey each year and is replaced by a new group that is included in the sample for four years before being rotated out in turn. 2 Beneficiaries enrolled in managed care plans are included in the MCBS, but detailed physician claims information is not available for them. 3 Anesthesia services were excluded from the RVU analyses since anesthesia services are paid using a different system of base and time units. 4 Medicare beneficiaries with ESRD were excluded because the monthly payment made to physicians for the management of ESRD patients was added to the RBRVS fee schedule in 1995. They thus would appear to have experienced a large increase in RVUs but in fact this was due only to a previously capitated service being added to the RBRVS fee schedule. Persons who were institutionalized were found to have different patterns of care use than non-institutionalized persons. Excluding all three of these populations reduced our sample to 9,627 beneficiaries in 1993 and 8,986 beneficiaries in 1998. 5 The RBRVS system and the methods used to update it are, of course, imperfect. Specialty societies have no incentive to identify overvalued codes. Surveys done of new codes before they are well established may reflect additional time and effort associated with learning how to perform the new service or procedure. In addition, the population receiving a service may change over time, which could change the amount of work and expense associated with the service. 6 To keep the entire fee schedule "budget neutral" in the years 1993 through 1995 and 1997, HCFA made across-the-board percentage cuts in the number of RVUs assigned to each service to balance the new codes and updates. Medical societies protested that this worked against the intent of the resource-based system and caused problems for other payers using the RBRVS system. As a result, budget neutrality adjustments in 1996 and since 1997 have been made through the conversion factor. The RVUs were cut by 2.8% in 1993, 1.3% in 1994, and 1.1% in 1995. The physician work portions of the RVUs were cut by 8.3% in 1997 after the five-year review. Before conducting our analysis, we re-inflated the RVU values to account for these changes. 7 The medical conditions in the models are included in the MCBS survey. The MCBS asks about medical conditions at different levels of specificity; for example, it asks respondents which of their joints are affected by arthritis but doesn't differentiate between emphysema, asthma, and COPD. However, we felt that the benefit of having a consistently reported set of conditions that captured respondents' medical history and did not depend on respondents' use of care outweighed these limitations. In addition, we fit the models using diagnoses on beneficiaries' Part B claims instead of using their self-reported conditions. This did not change our results qualitatively. 8 One might suspect that adverse selection would make the possession of insurance and the amount of expected expenditures endogenous. However, there is little evidence of adverse selection in the market for supplemental insurance once observable health status is controlled for (Lillard, Rogowski, and Kington, 1999; Hurd and McGarry, 1997) . This is due to the fact that the Medicare program effectively subsidizes supplemental coverage, which is frequently employerprovided. 9 The MCBS asks only a single question about total income for the respondent and spouse, if married. It misses income from other people, such as children, who may be living in the household and who can help pay some expenses. Second, combining all income into one question results in both a significant bias (typically under-reporting) and misreporting (Goldman and Smith 2001) . 10 We also fit model (1) using a two-part model with a probit model for the probability of any RVU use as the first part and a log-linear OLS model for the second part. Estimates from this model were retransformed using Duan's smearing estimator (Duan et al. 1983 ). In addition, we fit a variety of two-part models using generalized linear models (GLM) for the second part (Manning and Mullahy 2001) . We found that the two-part model with the GLM gamma function and a log link performed the best in terms of mean squared error and absolute prediction error. However, all of the models except for the OLS model overpredicted the mean of the 1993 sample and overpredicted RVU use by beneficiaries with major medical conditions. Since one of our major aims was to look at mean changes in use over time and by condition, we decided to use the standard OLS regression. (Regression coefficients from the twopart GLM gamma model are available from the authors. They are similar to the OLS model in sign and relative magnitude.) In addition, we experimented with including interactions between major medical conditions since comorbidities could be important predictors of service use. We found that the only interactions that were marginally significant were those between orthopedic conditions (hip fracture and osteoporosis) and some cancers and asthma/emphysema/COPD. However, these varied according to the way that comorbidities were specified and the interaction terms as a group were not jointly significant. 11 This definition of technological change does not capture the expansion of existing services to a new population, an issue that is addressed in the discussion section. 12 Laboratory RVUs are included in the total but not shown. They average less than one RVU per person in both 1993 and 1998. 13 The reduction in the number of beneficiaries with functional limitations is consistent with reported declines in disability among the elderly (Manton, Corder, and Stallard 1997) . 14 Trends in sites of care delivery can cause changes in the number of RVUs paid for under the physician fee schedule. Practice expense RVUs for some services delivered in inpatient settings are reduced relative to outpatient settings since the facility, rather than the physician, incurs the costs of staff, supplies and so on. Five hundred and thirty-four out of the more than 8,000 codes in our AMA databases were subject to these site of service differentials at the beginning of our time period; in 1998, 675 were. However, applying these site of service differentials in 1993 reduced the per beneficiary average number of RVUs by only .12. Applying them in 1998 reduced the RVUs by .57. Therefore, while we cannot comment on the exact magnitude of site of care shifts given the different sets of services covered by the differential, if anything the site of service differential seems to have had the effect of reducing RVUs more in 1998 than in 1993. 15 We had to estimate this difference because claimslevel information about the use of physicians'services by Medicare managed care enrollees is not collected by CMS nor by the MCBS, and previous research on the magnitude of selection between Medicare HMOs and FFS Medicare has been based on total costs or on the use of inpatient care. 16 This was calculated as follows: the FFS population was 94% of the total Medicare population in 1993. It was 84% of the total population in 1995.
Notes
If the 10% of beneficiaries who joined HMOs had spending that was half the average level of spending of those who remained, the effect on the average spending of the remaining 85% would be ¼ 1/[((84*1) þ (10*.5))/94]. 17 Some of the effects mentioned subsequently may be offset by other factors, such as learning by doing. However, we believe that on balance, the new and updated codes measure is a lower bound on the role of technology.
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